Why Hamas rejected the offer of a ceasefire in Gaza – and Netanyahu would do the same

Neither side seems to want the war to end. It is as simple and as tragic as that, writes former Israeli diplomat Alon Pinkas

Why, after 18 months, is there still a war raging in Gaza?

The answer is, in my opinion, because the Israeli prime minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, needs to perpetuate the war for political reasons – and Hamas cannot conceivably agree to end the war if it means relinquishing power or residual power. Neither side seems to want the war to end. It is as simple and as tragic as that.

Meanwhile, the one actor that could change this calculus – the United States – is effectively not in the game for now.

US president Donald Trump is unilaterally imposing broad and exorbitantly high tariffs on dozens of countries, pushing perilously closer to a fully fledged trade war with China; generating financial market turmoil; threatening Denmark – one of the 12 original founders of Nato – over his fixation of acquiring Greenland; and demeaning, threatening and imposing harsh tariffs on Canada.

With all of this – plus the abject failure of Trump’s attempts (I would call them pseudo-negotiations) to reach a ceasefire in the Ukraine-Russia war – it is perhaps all too easy to forget there’s still a war going on in Gaza. And now comes a new version of an old idea: a ceasefire and hostage deal.

The Israeli proposal, submitted to Egyptian mediators, includes several key points: A 45-day ceasefire that would commence with the release of Idan Alexander, an abducted Israeli soldier with a dual American citizenship. This would be followed by the release of 10 live Israeli hostages in three stages. In exchange, 120 Palestinians serving life sentences for direct involvement and execution of terror acts – and the additional release of “hundreds of Palestinian prisoners and detainees”.

The proposal then goes into details on the exact timetable, modalities and exchange keys, including the return of hostages who died or were executed while in captivity. During that time, the Israeli military said it would redeploy from areas it captured after it unilaterally broke the previous ceasefire on 18 March. Israel, according to its proposal, is willing to negotiate a permanent ceasefire and the end of the war (both of which prominently featured in the January ceasefire, which held for 58 days, after which Israel declined to proceed to “phase two”), but is not withdrawing from the Gaza Strip. Rather, Israel commits to local redeployments inside the strip.

Then comes the contentious part: the demilitarisation of Hamas. This is Israel’s condition for any agreement to end the war. While this makes sense – it is politically logical and can easily be justified, particularly after the savage events of 7 October 2023 – it simply won’t work (and won’t happen willingly and voluntarily).

Predictably, Hamas has already rejected the idea, saying in a statement, early Tuesday: “This is capitulation … We refuse disarmament as part of negotiations.” If Hamas maintains this position, the war will undoubtedly and inevitably continue.

This goes to the heart of how both sides define “victory”.

For Israel, anything short of total obliteration of Hamas and permanent removal from power would not be considered a victory, regardless of more than 50,000 Palestinians killed in the past 18 months – according to local health authorities – and the total destruction of Gaza.

Is that an attainable goal? Not if you look at what has happened since 7 October. Can it be achieved? Yes, but only if Israel occupies the entire Gaza Strip. And what happens then? That’s simple: if you occupy it, you own it. And “own” means taking care of the health system, food, potable water, humanitarian aid, the nearly non-existent Gaza Strip economy, law and order. Does Israel want to do this? Absolutely not. So what is it doing instead? Perpetuating the war without fully occupying the Gaza Strip – and setting up a military government.

Hamas inflicted on Israel a savage attack of historic proportions. The militant group, no doubt, consider it a depraved victory. But politically, they define “winning” as one man standing up and flying one flag once the war is over. The tragic events of 7 October did not change the fundamental asymmetry between a highly sophisticated and technologically superior military and an organisation operating in one of the densest swathes of land on earth.

But asymmetry can work both ways: Israel, with its disproportionate rebuke on Gaza, became mired in a complex and unwinnable urban warfare – and found itself subject to global scrutiny and condemnation, not least having to answer to accusations of genocide at the International Court of Justice in The Hague.

This savage war’s trajectory and longevity can also be attributed to a much broader and imprudent strategic aspect: Israel conspicuously and deliberately had no political goals other than destroying Hamas.

Its military means were never aligned with a coherent political objective, which is why Israel has refused to entertain any post-war Gaza plans or commitments. That is why Hamas is still there – and why the war continues.

Alon Pinkas is a former Israeli consul general to the US and was a political adviser to two former prime ministers, Shimon Peres and Ehud Barak